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Abstract 
This article begins by recounting a series of mass surveillance practices conducted by members of the “Five Eyes” spying 
alliance. While boundary- and intersubjectivity-based theories of privacy register some of the harms linked to such 
practices I demonstrate how neither are holistically capable of registering these harms. Given these theories’ deficien-
cies I argue that critiques of signals intelligence surveillance practices can be better grounded on why the practices in-
trude on basic communicative rights, including those related to privacy. The crux of the argument is that pervasive 
mass surveillance erodes essential boundaries between public and private spheres by compromising populations’ abili-
ties to freely communicate with one another and, in the process, erodes the integrity of democratic processes and insti-
tutions. Such erosions are captured as privacy violations but, ultimately, are more destructive to the fabric of society 
than are registered by theories of privacy alone. After demonstrating the value of adopting a communicative rights ap-
proach to critique signals intelligence surveillance I conclude by arguing that this approach also lets us clarify the inter-
national normative implications of such surveillance, that it provides a novel way of conceptualizing legal harm linked to 
the surveillance, and that it showcases the overall value of focusing on the implications of interfering with communica-
tions first, and as such interferences constituting privacy violations second. Ultimately, by adopting this Habermasian 
inspired mode of analysis we can develop more holistic ways of conceptualizing harms associated with signals intelli-
gence practices than are provided by either boundary- or intersubjective-based theories of privacy. 
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1. Introduction 
The Snowden revelations have shown the extent to 
which American, Australian, British, Canadian, and New 
Zealand signals intelligence agencies operate across 
the Internet. These agencies, collectively known as the 
“Five Eyes” (FVEY), have placed deep packet inspection 
equipment throughout telecommunications networks 
around the world to collect metadata and content 
alike. They have engaged in sophisticated signals de-
velopment operations by intruding into non-public 
commercial and government networks to access, exfil-
trate, and modify data. Their operations are so deeply 
integrated with one another’s that it is challenging, if 
not impossible, to analyze one member without analyz-
ing them all a single group. The breadth of these sig-
nals intelligence agencies’ activities has called into 
question whether they are intruding on the privacy of 
people all over the globe, including the privacy of their 
own citizens. 
This article begins by recounting of a series of mass 
surveillance practices conducted by the FVEY agencies. 
These practices reveal the extent of the FVEY agencies’ 
surveillance activities which, in aggregate, exceeds the 
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surveillance capabilities of any particular corporation 
or single state. Next, the article engages with how 
boundary- and intersubjectivity-based theories of pri-
vacy register harms associated with the FVEY mem-
bers’ signals intelligence activities. Whereas boundary-
based theories can account for some of the harms ex-
perienced by targeted individuals they are less able to 
register harms associated with the surveillance of glob-
al populations. In contrast, theories focused on the in-
tersubjective characteristics of privacy register how 
capturing the global population’s electronic metadata 
weakens the bonds needed for populations to develop 
the requisite relationships for fostering collective 
growth and inclusive lawmaking. However, these inter-
subjective theories of privacy are less capable of re-
sponding to individual harms than liberal theories of pri-
vacy. Ultimately, neither of these approaches to privacy 
are holistically responsive to legally-authorized mass 
surveillance practices conducted by the FVEY nations.  
The concluding sections of this article argue that 
privacy ought not to be used as the primary critique of 
the FVEY agencies’ mass surveillance practices given 
the deficiencies associated with liberal and intersubjec-
tive privacy theories. Instead, critiques of signals intel-
ligence surveillance practices can be grounded on why 
these practices erode boundaries between the public 
and private spheres, to the effect of eroding the au-
tonomy that underpins democratic processes and insti-
tutions. The erosion of these boundaries may be regis-
tered as privacy harms or—more broadly—as 
intrusions on communicative and association rights 
that are essential to democratic models of govern-
ment. These intrusions are made worse by the secrecy 
of the laws and rulings authorizing the FVEY’s surveil-
lance practices. The paper ultimately argues that a Ha-
bermasian grounded critique can identify privacy 
harms, but as symptoms of broader harms. Moreover, 
in adopting a Habermasian approach to critiquing the 
FVEY agencies’ practices we can readily identify how 
such surveillance has normative consequences beyond 
national boundaries, offers a more robust way of think-
ing about legal challenges to such surveillance, and 
clarifies how communications rights offer a way to cri-
tique and rebut unjust surveillance practices. 
2. Mass Surveillance, Unmasked 
The Snowden archives reveal the breadth of surveil-
lance undertaken by members of the Five Eyes alliance, 
which is composed of the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 
agencies of the United States (NSA), United Kingdom 
(GCHQ), Canada (CSE), New Zealand (GCSB), and Aus-
tralia (DSD). The FVEY members use their geographic 
positions and technical proficiencies to massively col-
lect information about the global population’s use of 
electronic communications, to target specific persons 
and communities, and to retain information about 
“non-targeted” persons for extensive amounts of time. 
The implications of such surveillance are taken up in 
subsequent sections, when analyzing the effectiveness 
of individual and collective theories of privacy to re-
spond to these modes of surveillance, as well as when 
analyzing how a Habermasian critique of surveillance 
more holistically accounts for harms linked to the 
aforementioned surveillance practices. 
The FVEY alliance collects communications data 
from around the world at “Special Source Operations”, 
or SSOs. Some surveillance programs associated with 
SSOs temporarily store all communications traffic routed 
to these locations. These communications are also ana-
lyzed and filtered to pick out information that is ex-
pected to positively contribute to a SIGINT operation. A 
Canadian program, codenamed EONBLUE, operated at 
over 200 locations as of November 2010 and was re-
sponsible for such analyses. Other agencies, such as 
DSD, may also have used the EONBLUE program (CSE, 
2010). Similarly, the United States runs deep packet in-
spection surveillance systems that parallel some of 
EONBLUE’s capabilities (Gallagher, 2013a; Bamford, 
2008). In the case of the United Kingdom, GCHQ’s TEM-
PORA program monitors at least some data traffic pass-
ing into and out of the country (MacAskill, Borger, Hop-
kins, Davies, & Ball, 2013). All of these countries share 
data they derive from SSO-located surveillance pro-
grams in near-real time; no single alliance member can 
effectively detect and respond to all of the Internet-
related threats that are directed towards any of these 
nations, nor can they comprehensively track the activi-
ties of individuals around the world as they use tele-
communications systems without the FVEY agencies 
pooling and sharing their collated data. The very capaci-
ties of the “national” programs operated by each of 
these member nations are predicated on accessing in-
formation collected, processed, analyzed, and stored by 
other member nations’ collection and analysis programs. 
Content and metadata alike are stored in the FVEY 
nations’ databases. Stored content includes, for exam-
ple, the content of encrypted virtual private network 
communications (NSA, 2010), email messages (Risen & 
Lichtblau, 2009), and automatic transcriptions of tele-
phone calls (Froomkin, 2015). In contrast, the metada-
ta databases store cookie identifiers, email addresses, 
GPS coordinates, time and date and persons involved 
in telephony events, IP addresses used to request data 
from the Internet, and more (Ball, 2013; Geuss, 2013; 
CSE, 2012b). Data stored in the content and metadata 
databases can be used to target specific persons or sys-
tems or networks. Such targeting operations can either 
involve establishing new “selectors”, or communica-
tions characteristics, that promote either the automat-
ic attempt to compromise the communications device 
in question or a set of more active efforts by analysts 
to deliver exploits to devices using more manual tech-
niques. In the case of the NSA, it may rely on the Tai-
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lored Access Operations (TAO) unit to fire “shots” at 
targets. These shots are meant manipulate targets’ in-
ternet activity to divert targets from the legitimate 
websites that they are trying access towards websites 
the NSA has compromised to install malware, or “im-
plants”, on the target’s device (Parsons, 2015; Weaver, 
2013, 2014). Targets can also be selected to receive 
implants using alternative methods depending on the 
technical proficiency and value of the target and secu-
rity of their devices; equipment shipments can be in-
terdicted in transit (Gallagher, 2014), USB drives depos-
ited in places where the target individual or someone 
they are a digitally associated with may find them (Gal-
lagher, 2013b), or network equipment that are used by 
contemporary or possible future targets are mapped 
for later infiltration or exploitation (Freeze & Dobby, 
2015). In all of these cases, an individual’s communica-
tions privacy is violated in order to mount a signals in-
telligence operation against the individual vis-à-vis 
their devices. 
SIGINT agencies also develop communications as-
sociation graphs to identify groups and group relation-
ships. Agencies may more closely monitor or disrupt a 
given group’s communications if they are regarded as a 
hostile threat or target. Being associated with “hostile” 
groups can involve being just three “hops” away from a 
person of interest to one of the SIGINT agencies 
(Ackerman, 2013). Actions taken against groups can in-
clude targeting key communicating members with 
“dirty tricks” campaigns, revealing whether a person 
views pornography (and what kind), exposing groups to 
“false flag” operations, or preventing communications 
from routing properly (Greenwald, 2014; Greenwald, 
Grim, & Gallagher, 2013). Little is known about the 
specifics of such operations, though documents per-
taining to the GCHQ and CSE and the NSA indicate a 
willingness to engage groups as well as individuals in 
the service of meeting the SIGINT agencies’ goals. In all 
of these cases, a group’s or population’s communica-
tions are captured and mapped against one another’s 
and thus the collective’s communicative privacy inter-
ests are engaged. Notably, such association mapping 
can take place even if no specific member of the group 
is actively targeted by a FVEY member; the mapping 
can occur automatically as algorithms make associa-
tions between different communicating parties based 
on data collected at SSOs. 
Information that is collected from SSO locations can 
become “useful” if a previously-untargeted person, 
kind of communication, or group(s) becomes notewor-
thy following a post-collection event. As examples, an 
individual’s telecommunications-related activities may 
be analyzed in depth months or years after the activi-
ties have actually occurred. Such analyses may be trig-
gered by accidentally communicating with a person 
who is targeted by a FVEY agency, by innocently using a 
communications method that is also used by persons 
targeted by the FVEY agencies, or simply by error. The 
result is that past activities can be queried to deter-
mine the relative hostility of a person, their intentions, 
or their past activities and communications partners, 
and without a person being able to rebut or contextu-
alize their past behaviours. They are effectively always 
subject to secret evaluations without knowing what is 
being evaluated, why, or the consequences or out-
comes of the evaluations undertaken by FVEY agencies’ 
intelligence analysts.  
In aggregate, the FVEY agencies are engaged in the 
mass collection of electronic communications data and 
can collect information from around the world because 
of their alliance. This data is collected regardless of 
whether any given person or group is of specific inter-
est to any particular FVEY member, and can be used to 
target specific persons or to understand the communi-
cations habits of large collections of people. The con-
tent and metadata of communications, alike, are ana-
lyzed and often retained. Even if collected information 
is not immediately useful it can be drawn upon months 
or years later. The result of this surveillance is that the 
world population’s communications are regularly col-
lected, processed, stored, and analyzed without indi-
viduals or groups being aware of how that information 
could be used, by whom, or under what terms and 
conditions. As discussed in the next section, such sur-
veillance raises privacy issues that neither boundary- 
nor intersubjective-based theories of privacy can holis-
tically respond to. 
3. Privacy Interests of the Subjects of SIGINT 
Surveillance 
The targeted and generalized SIGINT surveillance un-
dertaken by the FVEY agencies intrude upon individu-
als’ reasonable expectations of privacy. Such intrusions 
occur regardless of whether a human analyst ever ex-
amines the captured data or deliberately intrudes into 
a person’s communications devices. Theories of privacy 
based on concepts of boundaries or of intersubjectivity 
can be brought to bear to partially capture the unrea-
sonableness or illegitimacy of targeted and generalized 
surveillance. As will become evident throughout this 
section, however, neither conceptual approach cap-
tures the full ramifications of such surveillance. 
Privacy is perhaps most commonly thought of as a 
boundary concept, which rests on the conception that 
autonomous individuals enjoy a sphere within which 
they can conduct their private affairs separate from the 
public sphere of the government. This concept is root-
ed in liberal democratic theory where individuals are at 
least quasi-rational and need to be “free from” govern-
ment interference to develop themselves as persons 
who can then take part in public and private life (Ben-
nett & Raab, 2006, p. 4; Mill, 1859). This concept of pri-
vacy can be subdivided into a series of boundaries:  
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 spatial boundaries that see privacy “activated” 
when a space such as the home is viewed by an 
agent of government or unauthorized citizen 
(Austin, 2012; Warren & Brandeis, 1890) 
 behavioural boundaries identify activities that are 
meant to be secured from unwanted attention, 
such as sexual behaviours or medical matters or 
other “intimate” activities including those of the 
mind (Allen, 1985; Mill, 1859) 
 informational boundaries can identify kinds of in-
formation that are deserving differing levels of 
protection, such as information pertaining to 
one’s sexuality, religion, and increasingly between 
the content of communications versus the 
metadata associated with that content (Millar, 
2009; Strandburg, 2008; Rule, 2007) 
Concepts of privacy boundaries underwrite data pro-
tection and information privacy laws, which are them-
selves meant to “allow individuals rights to control 
their information and impose obligations to treat that 
information appropriately” (Parsons, Bennett, & 
Molnar, 2015). However, for any of the boundary con-
cepts to be “activated” and potentially register a priva-
cy harm a specific individual must be affected by the 
surveillance: this means that evidence of an intrusion, 
or likely intrusion, is required to determine whether an 
individual’s privacy has actually been violated. So, how 
might boundary concepts of privacy be squared against 
the FVEY agencies’ massive collection of metadata 
identifiers and the same agencies’ broad targeting of 
kinds of communications? 
A central challenge of determining if a violation has 
occurred is whether “personal” information has been 
monitored or captured by a third-party. Defining “per-
sonal information” can be “a contradictory maze be-
tween what privacy regulators ascribe as personally 
identifiable, what individuals understand as identifia-
ble, and what the companies operating themselves” 
(Parsons et al., 2015) perceive as requiring legal pro-
tection, to say nothing of how SIGINT agencies define 
it. In the latter case, as an example, the collection of 
data about the devices used by individuals is semanti-
cally and legally separated from the collection of, or 
targeting of, the individuals using those devices them-
selves (Plouffe, 2014) despite the same data being col-
lected in both situations. While legal claims asserting a 
violation are often based on a demonstrable infringe-
ment or likely infringement it may be impossible for in-
dividuals to demonstrate a clear violation given the se-
crecy of the FVEY agencies’ activities. 
The massive collection of data at SSOs enables the 
FVEY agencies to subsequently retain huge amounts of 
metadata. Metadata is important because, “[w]hen 
there is metadata, there is no need for informers or 
tape recordings or confessions” (Maas, 2015). In other 
words, metadata itself can “out” the individual and 
their associates. However, despite metadata’s capabil-
ity to enable the surveillance of persons as well as 
populations, it is unclear whether the capture of such 
data types necessarily constitutes a violation of a per-
son by way of collecting personal information on a per-
metadata record basis: is it the case that the capture of 
metadata only registers a violation when a sufficient de-
gree of information is captured? And, if so, how can that 
subjective evaluation based on competing interpreta-
tions of how much metadata is personal be arrived at, 
such that a common ruleset can be established to identi-
fy if a violation has occurred? These questions are rou-
tinely asked of corporations involved in the processing 
of metadata and gain increased weight when the data 
could be used to trace the activities of persons and 
their devices across their daily lives, around the world, 
to meet states’ national security objectives. 
Boundary concepts of privacy can be squared, to an 
extent, against the massive collection of metadata 
identifiers by clarifying the conditions under which per-
sonal privacy is intruded upon by the collection. 
Metadata databases are used to store cookie identifi-
ers, IP addresses, email and social media logins, and 
other pieces of data that, when combined, can reveal 
that particular identification tokens were used to ac-
cess services across the Internet. SIGINT analysts can 
run tests against stored data to ascertain whether they 
can correlate metadata information with that of indi-
viduals and, where they need additional information, 
can make requests for program enhancements or the 
broader collection of information to identify the indi-
viduals or their devices (Israel, 2015). Many of the tests 
are designed to abstractly ascertain how to answer 
questions—such as can the analyst identify specific 
kinds of phones using particular networks and, subse-
quently, link identifier information with those phones 
for more targeted analysis—and which may never be 
put into practice. However, the intent driving the col-
lection—to potentially target individuals—means that 
even if a person does not actually become targeted the 
collection of data is designed to place them in a persis-
tent state of prospectively-being targeted. The result is 
that metadata is not “less identifying” than the content 
of a communication, nor that absent specific targeting 
a person does not suffer a privacy violation. As a result 
of being always in a potentially-targeted category, indi-
viduals may alter their behaviours to try to secure their 
telecommunications from third-party monitoring. Such 
alterations may cause individuals to suppress their au-
tonomy in order to appear unobtrusive (Cohen, 2000) 
to government monitors without ever knowing what 
constitutes being obtrusive. 
Where a person’s communications have been de-
liberated targeted by a SIGINT agency it is relatively 
easy to register an individual harm: their personal 
communications device, or communications environ-
ments, are compromised with the intent to influence 
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or affect the individual based on what is discovered. 
Though there may be gradients associated with the in-
trusion, insofar as some modes of targeting specific 
persons reveal more or less sensitive information, a 
“boundary” is crossed by merit of monitoring spaces, 
activities, or kinds of information that individuals or 
their communities are receiving and transmitting. Of 
course, such intrusions may be justified—a legitimate 
national security threat may justify the intrusion—but 
regardless of the terms of justification an intrusion is 
experienced. 
In contrast to boundary theories of privacy, inter-
subjective theories of privacy focus on how privacy is 
principally needed to strengthen community and facili-
tate intersubjective bonds. Privacy, on an intersubjec-
tive account, is about enabling social interaction. Regan 
argues that privacy is “less an attribute of individuals 
and records and more an attribute of social relation-
ships and information systems or communications sys-
tems” (Regan, 1995, p. 230) on the basis that privacy 
holds: a common value, something that we all have an 
interest in; a public value, as essential to a democratic 
system of government; and a collective value, or a non-
divisible good that cannot be allocated using market 
mechanisms. In effect, Regan situates privacy as some-
thing that cannot be exchanged or given up in the mar-
ket on the basis that privacy is a common inalienable 
right or good. Valerie Steeves shares Regan’s position 
and demonstrates this when arguing that privacy must 
be “understood as a social construction through which 
“privacy states” are negotiated” (Parsons et al., 2015; 
Steeves, 2009). As a negotiated good, privacy is never 
any one person’s but instead possessed by the parties 
implicitly and explicitly involved in the social construc-
tion. Steeves’ work echoes Schoeman’s, who argued in 
part that protecting autonomy should not be bound up 
in boundary concepts of privacy because autonomy is 
about being able to develop new, deeper, and enhanced 
relationships (Schoeman, 1992). So for these theorists, 
efforts to individualize privacy or empower individuals 
to protect their privacy are the results of misinterpret-
ing the concept of privacy and its social purpose. 
So, on the one hand, intersubjective theories of pri-
vacy are concerned with how privacy is a common val-
ue that is needed to enable the actions of individuals 
situated in communities. On the other, scholars such as 
Nissenbaum focus on privacy as constituting “a right to 
live in a world in which our expectations about the flow 
of personal information are, for the most part, met; 
expectations that are shaped not only by force of habit 
and convention but a general confidence in the mutual 
support these flows accord a key organization princi-
ples to social life, including moral and political ones” 
(Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 231). Here social norms derived 
from the communities individuals find themselves 
within are used to determine what is an inappropriate 
intrusion into personal activities. Nissenbaum uses her 
term, “contextual integrity”, to parse out whether an 
intrusion has occurred. Integrity is preserved when in-
formational norms are respected and violated when 
the norms are breached. Where parties experience dis-
comfort or resistance to how information is collected, 
shared, or analyzed the discomfort is predicated on a 
violation of context-relative information norms; thus 
contextual integrity operates as a benchmark for priva-
cy (Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 140). The norms that can be 
violated are themselves developed based on force of 
habit amongst persons and their communities, their 
conventions, as well as a “general confidence in the 
mutual support” of information flows that “accord to 
key organizing principles of social life, including moral 
and political ones” (Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 231). How-
ever, Nissembaum tends to veer towards norms built 
into law when contested norms arise. She does so 
based on an argument that legally-established norms 
are more likely to be widely accepted in a given society 
because judges are ultimately responsible for deter-
mining whether the contextual integrity linked with a 
given informational norm or practice infringes on an in-
dividual’s reasonable expectation of privacy within a 
broader social context (Nissenbaum, 2009, pp. 233-237).  
Nissenbaum’s mode of settling contestations be-
tween norms is problematic for several reasons. First, 
new technologies routinely bring norms of privacy into 
flux. The consequence is that individuals are often chal-
lenged in negotiating norms amongst themselves 
(Turkle, 2012) and judges are not necessarily aware of 
how new technologies are, or may be, shaping norms 
of information control. Second, the groups within a na-
tion-state may hold differing normative accounts of 
what should constitute a reasonable expectation of 
privacy based on their lived experiences or cultural 
backgrounds; thus, while a law may hold that disclosing 
information to a third-party immediately reduces a 
person’s privacy interest in the disclosure, the same 
position may not be held by members of society who 
possess different understandings of privacy (Timm, 
2014). There is no guarantee that a judge’s or judici-
ary’s normative stance on any given privacy issue is 
necessarily representative of the social norms adopted 
by the parties involved in the disclosures in question. 
Third, there is the issue that signals intelligence-based 
surveillance transcends national boundaries: which 
norms should be appealed to when vast segments of 
the entire world’s communications are potentially be-
ing aggressively monitored? It seems unlikely that 
judges of national legal systems will enjoy a sufficiently 
expansive mandate, let alone capability, to settle in-
fringements on contextual integrity that involve all the 
world’s populations which are under the FVEY agen-
cies’ surveillance. Forth, when it comes to national se-
curity issues, judges may be reluctant to scrutinize 
these issues or oppose state positions for fear of the 
judgement ultimately facilitating a subsequent violent 
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event against citizens of the nation-state (Chandler, 
2009). Combined, these problematics can impose con-
servative or nationalistic understandings of social 
norms of privacy that are out of character with the ac-
tual norms maintained by significant proportions of na-
tional and global populations.  
At their core, intersubjective theories of privacy are 
attentive to the bonds that are responsible for forming 
and maintaining the communities in which individuals 
develop and act within: these theories take seriously 
the nature of humans as community-based creatures 
and the theories acknowledge the conditions needed 
for community and (by extension) individual flourish-
ing. In other words, these theories prioritize the bonds 
needed to create community whereas boundary theo-
ries of privacy prioritize spatial, behavioural, or infor-
mational boundaries to carve out private spheres for 
autonomous individual action. Intersubjective theories 
of privacy prioritize interpersonal bonds on the basis 
that intersubjective and social conditions of human life 
precede the emergence of an individual’s subjectivity. 
This prioritization follows Mead, who argued that hu-
mans become aware of themselves as individuals only 
through their social interaction with others (Mead, 
1934). Moreover, having developed subjectivity, hu-
mans rely on intersubjectivity-based modes of com-
munications to arrive at commonly held normative, 
ethical, and political positions (Warren, 1995). Social 
life then plays a significant role in shaping and inform-
ing how individuals unfold as a result of relationships 
they are situated in throughout their lives. 
An approach to privacy based on intersubjective 
concepts ably registers the “harm” associated with 
mass collection of telecommunications metadata, inso-
far as such data are used to map communities of com-
munication, associations between different parties, 
and mechanisms through which persons communicate 
with one another. An intersubjective-based privacy 
model registers that aggregated metadata can be 
deeply harmful to a given person’s or community’s in-
terests and even provoke individuals to retreat based 
on fears of potential discrimination. Thus, the collec-
tion of metadata infringes upon the privacy needed for 
communities of people to develop, communicate, and 
share with one another. The effects of metadata collec-
tion stand in contrast to the routine—if mistaken—
assertions that metadata are less revealing of individu-
als than the content of their communications and thus 
less likely to infringe upon privacy interests.  
For intersubjective models of privacy to register in-
dividual harms, however, they must appeal to how af-
fecting individuals has a corresponding impact on the 
communities in which they are embedded and on how 
those community-shared norms are responsible for 
identifying an individual’s harm. Consequently, individ-
ual harms resulting from targeted surveillance are reg-
istered as a secondary-level of harm, where the first-
level harm is registered in how the community is af-
fected by the retreat of the given individuals. This 
stands in contrast to a boundary model, where harms 
to the individual are what trigger a first-order harm. In-
tersubjective theories of privacy effectively shift the 
lens of harm: the focus is placed on how a community 
or group is affected by surveillance, first and foremost, 
and how such surveillance has a derivative effect on 
public engagement, the development of intersubjective 
bonds, and the actions undertaken by specific individu-
als included in the targeted community or group.  
Both individual- and intersubjective-based concep-
tions of privacy retain value in an era of pervasive mass 
surveillance. But by turning to deliberative democratic 
theory a more robust line of critique towards mass sur-
veillance can be mounted: such surveillance practices 
are not just problematic because they violate privacy 
rights or reasonable expectations of privacy but be-
cause the practices threaten to compromise the very 
conditions of democracy itself. As such, mass surveil-
lance endangers democratic governance domestically 
as well as abroad. 
4. Rebalancing Critique on the Grounds of Autonomy 
The FVEY agencies monitor groups and individuals to 
justify or support kinetic operations, such as those 
against militants or terrorists or foreign military agen-
cies. The agencies also conduct surveillance to inform 
economic policy advice, understandings of internation-
al organizations political leanings, as well as to support 
domestic agencies’ operations (Fung, 2013; Robinson, 
2013). Given the scope of potential targets, combined 
with the mass-collection techniques adopted by West-
ern agencies, the central critiques of the agencies’ op-
erations should not exclusively revolve around how 
these operations raise or generate privacy violations. 
Instead, a central line of critique should focus on ana-
lyzing the core of what the agencies engage in: the dis-
ruption, or surveillance, of communications through 
which citizens engage in deliberation, exercise their au-
tonomy, and conduct public and private discourse. 
While the FVEY agencies’ surveillance engages privacy 
rights the surveillance also engages more basic free-
doms such as rights to speech and association. A Ha-
bermasian deliberative democratic model offers a fer-
tile ground to address these deeper democratic 
problems based on an articulation of human autonomy 
and deliberation while simultaneously accounting for 
the privacy harms associated with the FVEY agencies’ 
surveillance activities.  
Habermas’ deliberative democratic model considers 
the co-original nature of what he calls private and pub-
lic autonomy. Both of these are intrinsically linked with 
speech acts which, today, routinely are made using the 
telecommunications systems monitored by the FVEY 
agencies. Per Habermas, these forms of autonomy are 
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equally needed to establish the basic laws of a nation-
state, which themselves secure individual and group 
freedoms. Specifically, individuals must be able to ex-
ercise their private autonomy as members of a collabo-
rative political process when first establishing constitu-
tions, charters, or first principles of law making. Public 
autonomy is made possible by engaging with others to 
create the terms for collaborative law making and as-
signment of political power, but doing so presupposes 
that individuals self-regard themselves as autonomous 
and thus capable of shaping their personal freedom 
vis-a-vis their group, or public, autonomy (Habermas, 
1998a). In short, it must be possible for individuals to 
recognize themselves as independently autonomous 
and, simultaneously, within social relationships in or-
der to establish basic laws protecting personal and 
group rights while acting within the context of shared 
political dialogue and negotiations.  
Neither the private autonomy of the individual or the 
autonomy expressed in engaging in public action pre-
cede one another; instead, they are co-original (Cham-
bers, 2003). As a result, all law emergent from these es-
sential concepts must shield the legally secured 
capacities to enjoy and express public and private au-
tonomy or else laws would risk infringing upon the very 
essential principles needed to take part in politics. This 
means that activities which infringe on either the pri-
vate or public expression of autonomy can be critiqued 
on the basis of the legitimacy of the activities, as well 
as based on how infringing upon a person’s private au-
tonomy affects their public autonomy and vice versa. 
As noted previously, under a Habermasian political 
theory model, communications are central to a per-
son’s development and expression of their autonomy. 
Habermas explicitly asserts the importance of commu-
nications as shaping core aspects of individuals’ rela-
tions with themselves and one another, writing: 
The social character of natural persons is such that 
they develop into individuals in the context of in-
tersubjectively shared forms of life and stabilize 
their identities through relations of reciprocal 
recognition. Hence, also from a legal point of view, 
individual persons can be protected only by simul-
taneously protecting the context in which their 
formation processes unfold, that is, only by assuring 
themselves access to supportive interpersonal rela-
tions, social networks, and cultural forms of life. 
(Habermas, 1998b, p. 139) 
Such supportive relations, networks, and forms of life 
are denied to persons and populations subject to per-
sistent and pervasive surveillance; the collection and 
retention of personal information can cause people to 
become prisoners of their recorded pasts and lead to 
deliberate attempts to shape how their pasts will be 
remembered (Solove, 2008; Steeves, 2009). Such at-
tempts can include avoiding deviant behaviour, refus-
ing to associate with groups at the margins of accepta-
ble society, or otherwise attempting to be “normal” 
and thus avoid developing or engaging with “abnor-
mal” social characteristics (Cohen, 2000; DeCew, 1997, 
p. 74). The stunting of communication, and the associ-
ated stunting of personal and social development, run 
counter to the development possibilities possible absent 
mass, untargeted, surveillance. In conditions of non-
mass surveillance, persons may engage in “direct frank 
communications to those people they trust and who will 
not cause harm because of what they say. Communica-
tion essential for democratic participation does not oc-
cur only at public rallies or on nationwide television 
broadcasts, but often takes place between two people 
or in small groups” (Solove, 2008, p. 143). While the 
monitoring of such communications will not end all con-
versations it will alter what individuals and groups are 
willing to say. Such surveillance, then, negatively affects 
communicative processes and can be critiqued on its 
capacity to stunt or inappropriately limit expressions of 
private or public autonomy (Cohen, 2000).  
Habermas does not argue that all government sur-
veillance is necessarily illegitimate or unjust. Rather, 
citizens must have knowingly legitimated surveillance 
laws that could potentially intrude upon their lives. The 
FVEY agencies’ surveillance practices, however, are ar-
guably illegitimate on the basis that these agencies ap-
ply secret interpretations to public law, while prevent-
ing the public from reading or gaining access to those 
interpretations (Office of the Communications Security 
Establishment Commissioner, 2006; Robinson, 2015; 
Sensenbrenner, 2013). Given the secrecy with which 
FVEY agencies conduct their operations there is little to 
no way for citizens to know whether such basic rights 
have been, or are being, set to one side by the FVEY 
agencies in their service to their respective executive 
branches of government. The consequence is that citi-
zens cannot perceive themselves as potential authors 
and authorizers of law that infringes legal protections 
designed to secure each citizen’s public and private au-
tonomy. Citizens cannot, in effect, legitimate laws that 
result in the mass and pervasive surveillance of the 
population based on the potential that one person may 
be a danger; such surveillance practices would stunt 
the individuals’ development and the development of 
the communities that individuals find themselves with-
in, as people limit what they say to avoid experiencing 
the (unknown) consequences of their speech.  
Habermas’ emphasis on the role of speech in ori-
enting political activity, combined with his theory’s crit-
ical nature, provide us with a way of critiquing the do-
mestic implications of mass surveillance activities as 
well as providing a path to identify the international 
implications of such activities. In the context of nation-
states, discourses and bargaining processes “are the 
place where a reasonable political will can develop”, 
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though this will requires the existence of communica-
tive conditions that do not unduly censor or stunt dis-
course (Habermas, 2001, p. 117). The process of delib-
eration lets citizens of nation-states develop, critique, 
and re-develop norms of political activity that are re-
flexive, temporally specific, and persistently develop-
ing; in the Habermasian system the arrival at laws vis-
à-vis deliberation “must allow for the greatest degree 
of inclusion, is never complete and remains open to 
the demands of future contestation” (Payrow Shabani, 
2003, p. 172). Laws and policies which prevent or inhibit 
deliberation can also be critiqued on grounds that they 
may inappropriately infringe upon the deliberative ca-
pacities of individuals or communities. Such laws and 
policies may be unjust (though not, necessarily, illegal) if 
they exclude groups or individuals from participating in 
deliberation processes linked to politics and lawmaking 
(Habermas, 1998c). This has implications for surveillance 
that stunts discourse which takes place amongst com-
munities and groups: such surveillance is unjust where it 
effectively excludes or hinders certain individuals and 
communities from developing shared understandings.  
Ultimately, the Habermasian model registers how 
harms to individuals and to communities are problem-
atic. Where an individual is unjustly targeted it can af-
fect how the person subsequently is able to, or is will-
ing to, express their autonomy. This, in turn, can limit 
their engagement in public deliberation. Such a limita-
tion both prevents a person from regarding themselves 
as involved in the lawmaking process, thus rendering 
passed laws as less legitimate, but also stunts public 
discourse that occurs within and between communi-
ties. Consequently a FVEY agency’s targeting of an indi-
vidual has effects for the individual and the communi-
ty. Monitoring all persons, such as through the massive 
collection of communications metadata at Special 
Sources Operations locations, also affects how com-
munities and individuals alike operate. The mapping of 
communications networks can chill what groups say, 
how they deliberate, whom they choose to include in 
deliberations, and the conclusions they decide to con-
sider. The result is that public deliberation itself is 
stunted. In the process, the individuals composing the 
groups are also affected insofar as the contexts where-
in they develop themselves—amongst the intersubjec-
tive bonds between one another and which are entan-
gled to become groups and communities—are stunted 
in their manifestation. While some of these harms may 
be acceptable to the deliberating public, such as when 
a public law is passed which authorizes authorities to 
wiretap specific persons believed to be engaging in so-
cially disapproved activities, surveillance predicated on 
largely or entirely secret interpretations of law and 
which threaten to chill the activities of an entire citi-
zenry represent an unacceptable type of surveillance-
related harm because it would inhibit all speech, not 
just that of specific bad actors.  
5. Conclusion 
Focusing critique of the FVEY agencies’ surveillance 
practices through the lens of Habermasian critical the-
ory is accompanied by a series of benefits. Such bene-
fits include making it theoretically clear how norm con-
testation can be broadened beyond national 
boundaries, inviting novel ways of thinking about legal 
challenges to such surveillance, and clarifying how 
communications rights offer a way to critique and re-
but unjust surveillance practices. In effect, by basing 
our understanding of privacy harms in a broader dem-
ocratic theory we can not only respond to harms asso-
ciated with privacy violations but also more broadly 
understand the role of privacy in fostering and main-
taining healthy deliberative processes that are central 
to democratic governance. 
To begin, the Habermasian model invites broaden-
ing normative claims of harm on grounds that activities 
which distort or damage the capacity for a citizenry or 
set of individuals to express public or private autonomy 
vis-a-vis deliberation can be generally subject to cri-
tique. In the case of pervasive mass surveillance, the 
activities undertaken by Western SIGINT agencies can 
affect how non-Western citizens deliberate and partic-
ipate in their political systems. Thus, whereas Nissen-
baum was forced to address how a national court could 
address international-based issues, the Habermasian 
approach is clearer on the relationship between mass 
surveillance and international norms. Specifically, such 
surveillance constitutes a violation of human rights of 
non-FVEY persons on the basis that human rights 
“make the exercise of popular sovereignty legally pos-
sible” (Habermas, 1998c, p. 259) by establishing the 
conditions for deliberation needed for the expression 
of private and public autonomy. In threatening those 
conditions, the FVEY nations are challenging the ability 
for other nations’ sovereignty not just by spying on 
them, but by stunting the legitimate deliberative pro-
cesses of other nations’ citizens just as they stunt the 
deliberative processes of their own citizens. Such stunt-
ing follows citizens in non-FVEY nations ceasing or 
modifying their deliberations. Moreover, such surveil-
lance transforms life-developing communications into 
instruments or data to potentially be used against for-
eign persons and the groups they operate within. The 
FVEY agencies are, in effect, actively subverting the 
basic rights that people around the world require to 
secure their private autonomy and create the medium 
through which those individuals, as citizens, can make 
use of their public autonomy. 
Second, by analyzing the FVEY agencies’ surveil-
lance practices through a Habermasian lens it is imme-
diately apparent how the targeting of individuals or the 
surveillance of the world’s populations en masse create 
reciprocating harms. The interference with individuals 
has ripple effects on their communities and vice versa. 
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Future work could explore how the targeting of com-
munities, then, ought to trigger tort-based claims of 
harm. Similarly, a Habermasian approach might give 
communities as distinct bodies a way of asserting harm 
to the collective as a result of their members having 
been targeted by unjust surveillance practices. In effect 
the co-originality of private and public autonomy, and 
associated need for individual persons to protect 
themselves along with their access to supportive inter-
personal relations, social networks, and cultural forms 
of life, may open novel ways of introducing into legal 
theory a reciprocal understanding of how harm to indi-
viduals is harm to their communities and vice versa. 
Finally, focusing on the importance of communica-
tions in developing private and public autonomy pro-
vides a mode of critiquing SIGINT operations that is 
more expansive than critiques of the FVEY agencies’ 
operations which are principally driven by theories of 
privacy. While privacy remains a legitimate path of cri-
tique, the broader Habermasian grounded critique lets 
us consider the breadth of opportunities that commu-
nications provide to individuals and communities, to 
the effect of revealing the extent of the harm tied to 
massively monitoring the globe’s communications. 
That is, a Habermasian lens lets us critique contempo-
rary mass surveillance practices on the basis that they 
infringe upon a host of constitutional- and human 
rights-protected activities, of which privacy is just one 
such violated right. By shifting our lens of critique to 
how signals intelligence operations threaten public and 
private right, vis-a-vis communications surveillance, 
and recognizing both rights as co-original concepts in-
stead of one preceding another, a range of political 
concepts, rights, and freedoms can be used in the anal-
ysis and critique of the FVEY agencies’ activities. Practi-
cally, adopting this approach could re-orient popular 
and scholarly debates: resolving the FVEY agencies’ 
surveillance practices would attend, first, to ensuring 
that communications rights themselves are secured on 
the basis of the democratic freedoms associated with 
such communications. Such a re-orientation should not 
exclude enhancing privacy protections provided to in-
dividuals and the communities they are enveloped and 
immersed within, but emphasizes that neither individ-
uals nor communities are more or less important and 
that the principal goal of privacy protections are to en-
sure that that deliberation and association can occur 
without undue coercion or surveillance.  
In summary, privacy alone should not be the prima-
ry or exclusive counter to understanding or critiquing 
the mass surveillance practices undertaken by Western 
SIGINT agencies. As discussed in this article, boundary- 
and intersubjectivity-based theories of privacy have 
limitations in how they can critique targeted and mass 
surveillance practices. And even the most promising in-
tersubjective theory of privacy that is specifically atten-
tive to mass surveillance harms is too nationally-
focused to account for the global nature of contempo-
rary SIGINT operations. But by adopting a Habermasian 
approach, which focuses both on communications and 
situates public and private autonomy as co-original, we 
can broaden the lens of critique of SIGINT practices 
while addressing limitations in privacy theories. More 
work beyond this article must be done to further build 
out how a Habermasian inspired theory of privacy can 
accommodate the already entrenched contributions of 
the existing privacy literature and explore how much, 
and how well, the contributions born of boundary and 
intersubjective privacy literatures can be (re)grounded 
in a Habermasian theoretical framework. But such hard 
work should not dissuade us from exploring new 
groundings for theories of privacy which may provide 
more holistic ways of critiquing contemporary targeted 
and massive signals intelligence practices. 
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